Groups are becoming increasingly important in organizations, and they use electronic groupware to facilitate communication and workflow. The author uses a 2 x 2 laboratory experiment with 96 participants to evaluate the interaction between communication channel and incentive structure when groups have to solve a mixed-motive task. The communication channel variable has two values: face-to-face (FTF) communication and computer-mediated communication (CMC). Also, the incentive structure has two values: group-based and individual-based values. This article compares the performance and information exchange truthfulness of groups under these different experimental conditions. The author utilizes a game theory perspective to study the behavior of members in these groups. The results indicate that communication channel and incentive structure mitigate strategies that lead to decision choices and information exchange truthfulness among members in a group.
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Many organizations embrace the concept of being virtual (Handy & Mokhtarian, 1996) and rely on team-or group-based problem solving while they communicate electronically. Hence, it is important to understand organizational structures and processes that influence the use of informationbased decision and communication aids such as group decision support systems (GDSS). These tools can support communication and decision making in virtual organizations. This article studies how incentive structures can mitigate the influence of the communication channel in virtual organiza-tions. The dependent variables that we study include performance, information exchange truthfulness, and game theoretic decision strategies. The article considers two incentive structures and two communication modes (i.e., face-to-face, FTF, and computer-mediated communication, CMC). The first incentive structure rewards members in the group according to their individual performance, and the second incentive structure rewards them according to the performance of the group as a whole. Incentive structures may influence the strategy that individuals employ to protect their stakes in the organization. Communication channels may influence the behavior and strategy that individuals in a group employ in a decision task and the trust relationships among members in a group. Much of the prior GDSS research has considered idea-generation tasks (Connolly, Jessup, & Valacich, 1990; Dennis, 1991; Easton, George, Nunamaker, & Pendergast, 1990; Watson, DeSanctis, & Poole, 1988) . This article operationalizes a mixed-motive negotiation task (McGrath, 1984) , explains the design of a GDSS to support this task, and studies the interaction of communication channel and incentive structure in this environment from a game theory perspective. The results should guide the design of GDSS that induce honest information exchange and facilitate group decision making in virtual work groups.
Incentive Structures
Although incentive structures have been studied extensively in the non-GDSS literature (Barua, Lee, & Whinston, 1995) , they are largely overlooked in distributed GDSS (DGDSS) settings where communication is possible via computer screens. Economists use game theory to explain the behavior of agents under different incentive structures and to model how decision makers make choices. The resulting models suggest that decision makers may play strategic games to maximize their payoffs. Although much of the literature on noncooperative games has concentrated on two party games, in a GDSS setting there usually exist multiple members within a group. Hence, it is important to study N-person games where N > 2, to focus on possible coalitions of size S where S < N, and to study the truthfulness of private information that is exchanged among members in the group. Therefore, this article uses concepts developed in cooperative game theory where issues such as coalitions, incentives, and information exchange truthfulness can be studied.
To describe an N-person game, we define v(N) as the worth of the N individuals working together for a grand coalition that is a coalition that involves all N members and provides the highest total payoff. It is possible for some members to form their own coalitions instead of working within the grand coalition scheme. In this case, v(S) for S⊆ N, is the worth of coalition S. A group is often created because the members can achieve a higher outcome if the N individuals work together than if they work alone. That is, there is synergy between group members, and the effort of members has a superadditive property. The payoff that results from the grand coalition, v(N), has to be divided among the N members in such a way that the allocations to all members referred to as imputations (x 1 , . . . ,x i , . . . ,x N ) do not exceed the total payoff generated from the grand coalition. Each member has an incentive to cooperate and engage in the grand coalition if his or her share of the grand coalition exceeds what he or she can achieve by working alone. The CORE is the subset of imputations x i (payoff to individual i) such that the sum of all the imputations to all individuals does not exceed the total payoff that results from working together. A grand coalition can be broken because often in many types of cooperative games the unanimous consent of all players is needed to achieve the joint payoff v(N). A typical solution in the CORE that provides a compromise solution (solution that is fair to all members) is the center of the CORE.
The payoff that results from the grand coalition is the highest that can be achieved, and hence any deviation from the grand coalition will be suboptimal with respect to the total payoff to the group. However, if each member is not guaranteed to receive an imputation that is higher than what he or she can achieve by working alone or by creating a coalition with a subset of others, he or she will not cooperate to achieve the grand coalition. Hence, some individuals may engage in free-riding behavior, meaning that they will not contribute their fair share but will benefit from the group's combined outcome. To prevent free riding, some incentives reward members based on their contribution alone instead of the group outcome. With this type of incentive structure, there is little synergy in working together and coordinating activities. Every member will make the best decision based on the private information that he or she has. Incentive structures can be designed to promote a distributive (win-lose) or an integrative (i.e., win-win in a two person game) negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1981) . Individuals engaged in a negotiation task are likely to behave cooperatively if they view the negotiation as win-win and are likely to behave individualistically if they view negotiation as win-lose. Incentive structures can affect the way members cooperate or compete, exchange information (Whang, 1993) , and perform or shirk their responsibility (Barua et al., 1995) . Incentive structures that reward the members equally based on the performance of the group may result in free riding, especially when the effort of individual members is not observable by others. When the incentive structure is individual based, a member's payoff for a specific outcome is affected by his or her own effort and private information. The fact that every member's reward is tied to his or her performance is likely to motivate the individual to work hard to maximize his or her reward in the absence of task interdependence.
Incentives can induce members to adopt a cooperative orientation or an individualistic orientation (Deutsch, 1973) . With the cooperative orientation, one has an incentive to do well while being concerned about the payoff that others receive. With an individualistic orientation, one has an incentive to do as well as he or she can without concern for the payoff for others in conflict situations.
In the current study, one incentive structure provides bonuses to each member based on the group decision outcome and is often designed to promote a cooperative orientation, whereas the second incentive structure provides each member with a bonus based on individual decision outcome and is often designed to promote an individualistic orientation. Deutsch (1973) suggests that mutual awareness of a shared cooperative orientation is likely to help establish mutual trust. Mutual trust can positively influence information sharing, whereas mutual awareness of a shared individualistic orientation is likely to result in a relationship of mutual suspicion that can negatively influence information sharing. Members in a group generally negotiate on the basis of their perceptions of each other's trustworthiness and fairness, and communication channel can influence these perceptions.
Communication Channel
This research compares groups using a GDSS at the same time and in same place to those using a GDSS at the same time but in different places. Communication channel may affect group interaction and information exchange. Johansen et al. (1991) refers to a GDSS designed for distributed members interacting at the same time as DGDSS. Prior research suggests that DGDSS groups communicate differently than do FTF GDSS (FGDSS) groups and that design requirements for a GDSS that supports each of these groups is substantially different (Hightower & Sayeed, 1995 Turoff, Hiltz, Bahgat, & Rana, 1993) . In DGDSS groups, physical structures and/or distance are used to separate the members (Rice, 1992; Rice & Aydin, 1991) . FGDSS groups, being in the same location, have the opportunity and psychological obligation for FTF communication (Monge & Kirste, 1980) . DGDSS groups cannot engage in FTF, verbal, or other forms of nonverbal (i.e., body language) communication. Hence, there is less social presence associated with DGDSS than with FGDSS. FTF communication uses a rich communication channel, whereas CMC uses a lean electronic communication channel (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) . Lean channels of communi-cation and low social presence characterize insensitive, cold, and impersonal environments. Low social presence, however, makes it more difficult to establish a shared cooperative context (Zack, 1993) . With a shared cooperative context, members perceive higher level of cooperation that can lead to more truthful exchange of information.
The level of social presence affects the way individuals perceive their discussions and their relationships with others. The high level of social presence affects decision processes and outcomes (Green & Gange, 1983; Zajonc, 1965) . FTF communication has a positive influence on nonverbal compensatory reactions (Coutts & Ledden, 1977) and attraction (Newcomb, 1961 ) and a negative relationship with the arousal of anxiety and hostility (Allegeier & Byrne, 1973) . Low social presence may translate into reduced sense of responsibility for one's actions, less fear and guilt, and diminished concern for personal standards of judgment and morality (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989) . Much of the nonverbal and verbal communication cues that form a normal part of human interaction are filtered in a DGDSS group, resulting in lower social presence and less truthful exchange of information.
Another theory that addresses communication modes is media richness theory (MRT; Daft & Lengel, 1986; Trevino, Lengel, & Daft, 1987) , which has been the focus of many recent studies (Barkhi, Jacob, Pipino, & Pirkul, 1998; Barkhi, Jacob, & Pirkul, 1999; Chidambaram & Jones, 1993; Dennis & Kinney, 1998; Fulk & DeSanctis, 1995; Lee, 1994; Markus, 1994; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Straus, 1999; Zack, 1993) . MRT classifies communication media along a continuum of low to high richness using four criteria including feedback, multiple cues, language variety, and personal focus. The basic tenet of MRT is that rich media provide a better fit for tasks that involve high equivocality, whereas lean media provide a better fit for tasks that involve low equivocality. Equivocality can be resolved through the mutual development of common goals and the enactment of a common solution, and this is facilitated when members use a rich communication mode.
Social influence theory (SIT; Fulk, Schmitz, & Steinfield, 1990; Fulk, Steinfield, Schmitz, & Power, 1987) questions the basic assumptions of MRT and postulates that media perceptions are in part socially constructed, vary by user and the social context, and are subjective and that making choices about media is retrospectively and subjectively rational. Schmitz and Fulk (1991) found support for the SIT but also found that perceived richness is consistent with the objective characteristics of richness defined by MRT. They found that individuals in their study perceived FTF and CMC as the extremes of the richness continuum from highest to lowest. Others have found that media affect social information processing (Rice & Aydin, 1991) .
We note that FGDSS groups use verbal and nonverbal communication (i.e., body language and facial expressions), whereas DGDSS groups only use CMC. Hence, they differ in the richness of their communication and the level of social presence. Rice and Gattiker (2001) provide a table that compares FTF and computer conferencing along many dimensions and attributes. The major categories in their table include constraints (i.e., temporal proximity, use of filtering, converting content to other medium), bandwidth (i.e., gestures, tone and emphasis, social presence), interaction (i.e., synchronous or asynchronous, symmetry of initiation and response, types of feedback, quickness of response), and network (i.e., information flow, role effect, critical mass).
Communication Mode and Incentive Structure
Incentive structure may induce a social context (i.e., cooperative or individualistic). Social context can in turn mitigate media perceptions (Schmitz & Fulk, 1991) . Incentive structures can influence the degree of equivocality in a task, making a rich channel a better fit for group-based incentive and a lean channel a better fit for individual-based incentive (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993) . In addition, high levels of social presence may promote truthful information exchange, making it more appropriate for group-based incentive. Hence, according to MRT, SIT, and social presence theory, incentive structure and communication channel can influence each other. We suggest that a particular communication channel may intensify the level of conflict that an incentive structure promotes.
Communication channel shapes the framing of issues by encouraging or discouraging information sharing as parties attempt to develop shared viewpoints (Poole, Shannon, & DeSanctis, 1990) . FTF individuals are more likely to enjoy their communication and to communicate more (Conrath, 1973; Monge & Kirste, 1980) . FGDSS groups using an FTF communication channel may find it easier to define issues together to develop common ground (Nyhart & Dauer, 1986) . This implies that for group-based incentive where building common ground is more crucial than it is for individual-based incentive, FGDSS group structure may be more appropriate than DGDSS group structure. Sheffield (1992) has found that media with reduced eye contact lead to better negotiated outcomes than do FTF modes in individualistic climates but not in cooperative environments. In another study, Sheffield (1989) examined the effects of the bargaining orientation (maximize individual outcome or maximize joint outcomes) and media (text, text and visual, audio, audio and visual) on group negotiations. The results showed that the absence of visual communication inherent in computer conferencing was better when the individuals were told to maximize their individual outcomes (individualistic bargaining orientation). The lean communication mode prevented bargainers from being distracted by visual cues that may be misinterpreted as conveying competitive or hostile intent. The lean communication mode, however, was found to be inappropriate when the individuals were told to maximize their joint outcomes (cooperative bargaining orientation). Maximizing joint outcomes may require members to establish a shared cooperative context that may be more effectively accomplished in FTF groups (Zack, 1993) .
A DGDSS may have a negative effect on mixed-motive tasks in that it can foster the view of negotiation as a win-lose situation (Rhee, Pirkul, Jacob, & Barkhi, 1995) . Negotiators with a win-lose orientation become more individualistic and may not exchange truthful information. Hence, they may not be able to find a noninferior solution that is best for every member involved. By depersonalizing communication, lean media induce group members to exchange minimal information because the parties do not think the information is important to communicate (Poole et al., 1990) . We study the effect of communication mode and incentive structures on group interaction, performance, and information exchange in groups using a Level Two GDSS (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987 ) that provides communication support and group decision aiding techniques.
Hypotheses
Group Performance
When the incentive is group based, each person's payoff depends on other people's efforts. Hence, as each member's productivity is increased (high effort), others will benefit. On the other hand, if a member is not productive (shirks), other members will have a diminished payoff. We operationalize an experiment where there is synergy in cooperation (the sum of payoffs is less than the payoff for grand coalition). When the incentive is group-based and everyone is productive but one person, the person who is not productive is taking a free ride. Productivity is a function of effort that is private information. Hence, the way we operationalize the task, each person's effort level will not be visible to others.
When the incentive structure is individual based, a member's payoff is not affected by other members' decision strategies when there is no task interdependence. Hence, under an individual-based incentive structure, each member increases effort to maximize his or her payoff irrespective of the effort level of other members. However, under a group-based incentive structure, especially when monitoring is difficult because effort is the private information of the individual (i.e., it may be hard to observe effort of knowledge workers), members may engage in free-riding behavior. If the members engage in such behavior, they may bear the fruit of other members' efforts without having to incur the personal costs associated with their own increased effort (i.e., take free rides). In an attempt to prevent others from taking free rides, one may engage in free-riding behavior oneself. This argument leads to an equilibrium state that results in reducing the overall group productivity and hence lowering group performance. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The performance of GDSS groups with individual-based incentives will be better than that of GDSS groups with group-based incentive structures in the absence of task interdependence across members.
The group-based incentive structure is likely to encourage members to engage in free-riding behavior. If most members become free riders, the group's performance will suffer. Hence, it is important for the group to communicate effectively to cooperate and prevent free-riding behavior. Often, when parties are allowed to communicate, cooperation among persons in social dilemmas improves, and hence free riding will diminish similar to the prisoner's dilemma. The question remains, will the group members be able to convince each other not to engage in free-riding behavior more effectively in FGDSS groups than in DGDSS groups? The theories cited earlier suggest that the rich channel in FGDSS groups is more appropriate for tasks that involve uncertainty and equivocality. The members have to resolve uncertainty and equivocality and develop a cooperative context, and this is more difficult when social presence is low. Accordingly, we expect that FGDSS will facilitate the group to more effectively solve the problem of free riding than will DGDSS when the incentive structure is group based, suggesting that Hypothesis 2: The performance of DGDSS groups will be lower than that of FGDSS groups when the incentive is group based.
The effect of communication channel may be less significant when the incentive is individual based than when it is group based. With individualbased incentive, there may be less need for members to interact, whereas 653 Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems with group-based incentive, they need to interact to establish a shared cooperative context. This means that the communication channel will be less influential when the incentive is individual based than when it is group based. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The performance difference between FGDSS groups and DGDSS groups will be smaller in groups with an individual-based than those with a group-based incentive structure.
Decision Strategies
With an individual-based incentive structure, a member's reward does not depend on the productivity (effort) of other members. Hence to maximize payoff, each member selects a productivity level that is best for him or her irrespective of the strategy that leads to the grand coalition. Because of low equivocality associated with individual-based incentive, decision makers do not need to interact very much with one another, and hence the communication channel should not significantly influence their strategy. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed in null form:
Hypothesis 4: When incentive is individual based, decision makers will deviate from the grand coalition as frequently in FGDSS groups as in DGDSS groups in the absence of task interdependence across members.
When incentive is group based, a member's payoff depends on his or her strategy and on the strategy employed by others. If members deviate from the grand coalition, the resulting payoff will be less than what they can achieve from the grand coalition. They could select this solution if they could trust each other and establish a shared cooperative context. When incentive is group based, each member does not know the true value of his or her contribution to the overall group payoff that results from grand coalition. That is, individual worth is uncertain with a group-based incentive because payoff is a group outcome that results from the synergy of cooperation. The uncertainty about each individual's contribution to the payoff resulting from the grand coalition makes allocating payoff to individuals (i.e., x i ) difficult. Hence, some individuals may receive an allocation from the payoff for the grand coalition that is less than their individual worth, and others may receive an allocation that is higher than their worth. This incentive increases the interdependence among member payoffs, and the information that one receives from others becomes more critical. Hence, individuals are more likely to exchange untruthful information in an attempt to mislead others about their true worth (i.e., the payoff they can achieve on their own).
The cooperative strategy that leads to building the grand coalition requires each member to coordinate his or her decision with those of others. When the communication channel is too lean, the cooperative strategy may be less likely. It is expected that the FGDSS groups, having a rich communication channel, will be better able to resolve problems arising from a lack of a shared cooperative context than will the DGDSS groups. Hence, we expect the rich FGDSS groups to overcome to some degree the shortcomings of the groupbased incentive structure (i.e., free-riding behavior). Therefore, we propose that members in FGDSS groups will correctly identify the cooperative strategy more frequently than will their DGDSS counterparts, suggesting that Hypothesis 5: When incentive is group based, members in FGDSS groups will select the cooperative strategy more frequently than will members in DGDSS groups.
Truthfulness of Information Exchange
When the knowledge necessary to solve a problem is distributed among different group members, the accuracy and truthfulness of the information that is exchanged becomes critical to improved decisions. Hence, the effect of communication channel and incentive structure on the degree to which members share truthful or distorted information with others is of particular interest. From the research cited earlier, the FGDSS groups, in contrast to the DGDSS groups, should facilitate the exchange of information as a means of resolving equivocality and establishing a shared context. In DGDSS groups, communication richness is low, and social presence is low. As a result of low social presence in DGDSS groups and the fact that the members do not have to face each other, the tendency to be untruthful may be higher in the DGDSS groups than in the FGDSS groups. Low social presence may make it easier for members in DGDSS groups to act in their own self-interest and adopt an individualistic orientation rather than a cooperative orientation. Whenever the nature of communication requires the individuals to constantly assess each other's reactions, to assess accurately the atmosphere of the meeting, and to be sensitive to personal feelings of the group members, then a medium high in social presence is preferred (Short et al., 1976) . FGDSS is more appropriate for establishing a shared context, whereas DGDSS is more appropriate for operating within an already established context (Zack, 1993) . We expect that members of FGDSS groups, in an attempt to establish a shared cooperative Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems context, will tend to reveal their private information more truthfully to others than will members of DGDSS groups. Hypothesis 6: The members of FGDSS groups will reveal their information more truthfully than will members of DGDSS groups.
Frustration With the Process
For a simple mixed-motive task, prior research has generally reported lower frustration with the process in FGDSS groups than in DGDSS groups (Rhee et al., 1995) . DGDSS supports a lean electronic communication channel that restricts the communication of some contextual cues compared to the communication channel supported by FGDSS. Members are likely to feel more frustrated with the constrained communication environment, and the lower level of social presence in DGDSS is likely to lead to higher frustration.
Hypothesis 7: Frustration will be lower for members of FGDSS groups than for members of DGDSS groups regardless of the incentive structure.
Method
Design
This experiment was conducted using a 2 x 2 (Communication Channel x Incentive Structure) experimental design. Communication channel had two levels: FTF and CMC used with a GDSS (i.e., FGDSS and DGDSS). Incentive structures had two values: group based and individual based. Individuals were randomly assigned into one of the four experimental cells, and each cell contained 24 individuals. Each group consisted of 3 group members and a group leader, and hence there were a total of 24 individuals per experimental cell.
Participants. A total of 96 advanced college students (juniors and seniors) were recruited from business decision making courses at a large American university to participate in this study. The average age of the participants was 21 years old, and the participants were approximately 60% male and 40% female.
Members of FGDSS groups were seated in a meeting room and could communicate both verbally and via a computer during the problem-solving session. Members of DGDSS groups were physically separated and did not have FTF contact.
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Of the course grade, 15% was allocated for the experiment. Each student's grade on the experiment was directly proportional to his or her task performance. We conducted the experiment early in the semester so that students had no grade cushion. The grade on this experiment provided strong motivation to do well in the experiment.
Incentive structures. The first incentive structure gives bonuses based on how well departments perform individually, and the second gives bonuses based on how well they perform as a group. The surrogate measure for departmental performance (individual-based performance) in many organizations is how well the departments control their costs compared to some prespecified projected standard costs. The corresponding surrogate for departmental contribution to the organizational profit (group-based incentive) is a bonus that is tied to organizational profit. The Appendix provides the details of the group-based and individual-based incentives operationalized in this study. We compare these two different incentive structures and how they mitigate the influence of communication channels.
Task. The task used in this experiment is a production-planning problem. To reach a final decision of the production plan, department managers negotiated and exchanged information and on average arrived at a group decision within 90 minutes.
The task is described next. A company manufactures four products. A customer order consists of some combination of all four products, each tailored to the customer's specifications. Associated with each order is a total revenue value that depends on the number of products and the complexity of modifying the products to satisfy the specific requirements. For example, an order might consist of 200 units of Product 1, 450 units of Product 2, 200 units of Product 3, and 400 units of Product 4. Associated with each order is a departmental projected cost that is the best estimate the organization has on how much it should cost that department to fill a particular order. Each department has information about its internal costs, the actual departmental cost (ADC), that is not available to others. The department may reveal these costs to others. The ADC may decrease as a department increases the effort level. Furthermore, each department has information about uncompensated departmental effort cost (UDEC) that represents the extra costs the department incurs for filling an order for a specific level of effort. In general, the harder the departments work, the lower the ADCs become. However, the harder the department works, the more departmental resources are used. The UDEC captures the extra cost of departmental resources. In essence, the ADC is a decreasing function of effort, whereas the UDEC is an increasing function of Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems effort in the department. Effort level decisions depend on incentive structures and the tradeoffs between ADC and UDEC. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship between these values for the individual incentive and the group incentive, respectively. This task was adopted from prior research (Barkhi et al., 1998) .
Dependent Variables
The hypotheses use several measures that depend on the treatments and help us compare the influence of the DGDSS and FGDSS and the two incentive structures. The dependent variables are explained next. Performance. The performance of each individual is calculated by the payoff that he or she receives on the task. That is, the solution that an individual adopts is evaluated using the incentive function that he or she is given to maximize.
Deviation from grand coalition. The deviation from the grand coalition is operationalized by counting the number of times that each member engages in a decision that does not result in the grand coalition. This frequency is a metric used to measure this dependent variable.
Truthfulness of information exchange. When information is distributed among different group members, the truthfulness of the information that is exchanged may influence decision outcomes. Truthfulness of information exchange is operationalized by measuring the ratio of information that a member sends to others that is the truthful value of the cost information in his or her department. The measure of truthfulness is used because the notion of truthful or untruthful information exchange and the frequency of this behavior (ratio of truthful exchange to total exchange) describes the notion of truthfulness. We checked the magnitude originally as well but decided to not use it because the different costs and the way different magnitudes would mean different things for different production plans made the magnitude highly confounding as a measure of truthfulness. For example, for a production plan, a 10% untruthful reporting would make a difference in some measure of production, and for some others, 30% would not make a difference in the final outcome depending on the combination of orders. The large number of combinations for each production plan made it impossible for participants to know how much change is enough to influence the decision. Utilizing only the truthful or untruthful measure that we described in this study regardless of the magnitude prevented a confound that would have made it difficult to explain the results. The way we operationalized the truthfulness provides the metric that captures the notion of truthfulness. If they were untruthful, we documented that and did not focus on the magnitude given that we wanted to measure the untruthful behavior and not level of untruthfulness.
Frustration. Frustration is measured by a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not frustrated) to 7 (extremely frustrated). Decision strategies. The task was designed so that the dominant strategy that results in the grand coalition for Player 1, when incentive is individual based, is to select the optimal effort level (row 2 of Table 1 ). The optimal effort 659 Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems level provides the highest payoff for each manager regardless of the effort levels expended by other managers. The payoffs to other managers also show that the best they can do is to select optimal effort levels (column 2 of Table 1 ), resulting in the grand coalition. This strategy results in higher payoff than other alternatives regardless of the effort level choice strategy of Player 1. Thus, the best strategy for both players is to select optimal effort levels as determined by their higher corresponding rewards. This strategy gives Player 1 a payoff equal to 60 and Player 2 (combined payoffs for managers of production and purchasing departments that are treated as Player 2) a payoff equal to 139. No other strategy could increase the payoff of Player 1 and Player 2.
To construct a metric for understanding the average strategy that is employed for each experimental condition, we take the total number of times that members selected optimal effort levels for each order and divide that by total number of orders. We compare these ratios between different treatment conditions.
GDSS Features
We designed a GDSS to support the problem solving and communication needs of the cross-functional groups. The GDSS ran in a PC Windows environment with a LAN that supported Novell Netware. Both FGDSS and DGDSS groups were supported by this GDSS, where the only difference is the communication channel: FTF and CMC. The GDSS provides modeling and optimization capabilities, information exchange facilities, what-if capability, and the capability to capture group memory. We classify the GDSS as a Level Two GDSS as defined by DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987) because of its modeling capability. The GDSS provides process support (i.e., information exchange via predefined templates), task structure (i.e., modeling and whatif capability), and task support (i.e., optimization capability) as proposed in a framework by Nunamaker, Dennis, Valacich, and George (1991) . The GDSS consists of three main screens: GDSS Menu, Outgoing Messages, and Public Message Board. The information exchange facility allows users to send textual messages and task-specific templates of information. The screen for textual message exchange has two major windows. In one window, the user can type messages for others. In a second window, the user can observe all messages that have been sent to him or her.
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The task-specific templates provide the means to exchange information by using predefined templates. This facilitates the exchange of structured and numeric information. Examples of such templates include those that allow members to transmit their departmental cost information to others and to propose solutions to other members of the group. When a task-specific template is transmitted, the local database of each recipient is automatically updated. The modeling capability of the GDSS selects the appropriate model for the problem from the model-base component of the GDSS. It uses the information in a group member's database to formulate specific problem instances and to solve each one optimally. Because each member has to specify the effort he or she exerts, a preliminary screen asks each member to assign a specific effort level (from lowest, 1, to highest, 4) to each order. The GDSS then uses the costs (ADC and UDEC) associated with these effort levels to formulate the model of the problem that we presented earlier. The GDSS uses an optimization module to compute the optimal solution to the problem along with the corresponding reward to the user (see Figure 3) person to examine the incremental effect of changes to a solution or to examine the effects of changes in effort levels on a previously evaluated solution set. Group memory capability keeps a history of all proposed solutions. Group members have information available about the solutions that have been proposed to date by the various group members. This feature aids in the negotiation process by providing a participant with information about the preferences of other individuals and how these preferences are changing over time.
Results
Data analysis for this type of theoretical model calls for multiple regression when combination of main effects and interaction effects are posited (Boal & Bryson, 1987) . After running the multiple regression, a Duncan multiple range test was used to isolate differences in the means of the dependent variables. A general representation of the model is
Y is the dependent variable, X 1 is an indicator variable representing FGDSS or DGDSS, X 2 is an indicator variable representing group-based or individual-based incentive, and X 3 is the interaction term. As it is commonly applied, the moderated regression analysis was done in two steps. The main effects were entered on the first step, and the interaction terms were entered on the second step. The results for each hypothesis, along with their significance levels, are provided next.
Hypothesis 1
The results show that the performance of groups with individual-based incentives was better (M = 72.07, SD = 20.53) than that of groups with a group-based incentive structure (M = 109. incentives engage in free-riding behavior by selecting low effort levels less often in FGDSS groups than in DGDSS groups. Perhaps the members in DGDSS groups selected low effort levels more often compared to FGDSS groups because the limited communication cues (i.e., as is the case with prisoner's dilemma) created the impression that others would take free rides. In an attempt to protect themselves from free riders, they had an incentive to become free riders themselves.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 is supported. The performance difference between FGDSS groups and DGDSS groups is not statistically significant when the incentive is individual based, F(10) = .88, p < .36, Cohen's d 2 = 0.58, but is statistically significant when it is group based, F(1, 10) = 7.56, p < .02, Cohen's d 2 = 1.82.
As expected, members in DGDSS groups had lower performance on average when incentive was group based (M = 59.17, SD = 6.20) than when it was individual based (M = 104.47, SD = 25.50). The question is whether members in FGDSS groups using the richer media can help overcome this shortcoming of group-based incentive structure. There is less undesirable free-riding behavior among members in FGDSS groups, but still the incentive scheme overrides the effects of communication channel. On average, the performance of members in FGDSS groups is lower when incentive is group based (M = 84.97, SD = 22.12) than when it is individual based (M = 115.12, SD = 10.71). Hence, the undesirable free-riding behavior is persistent under the groupbased incentive structure even among members in FGDSS groups. In addition, comparing the Cohen's d 2 (0.58 vs. 1.82) suggests that communication mode does not equally influence different incentive structures.
Hypothesis 4
The experimental results support Hypothesis 4. When incentive is individual based, members (n = 18 per experimental cell) will deviate from the grand coalition (optimal effort) as frequently in FGDSS groups as in DGDSS groups. Specifically, the experimental data suggest that when incentive is individual based, the ratios are .78 for members in FGDSS groups and .72 for members in DGDSS groups based on the Duncan test results (p > .05). Hence, the equality of the two ratios (using a statistical ratios test) is not rejected because the difference is not statistically significant. The results indicate that when incentive is individual based, communication channel does not affect the strategy that members employ. In other words, the choice is Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems deterministic and unambiguous, and the communication channel will not influence how members select their clear choice.
Hypothesis 5
Table 2 presents the reward matrix for members in groups with group-based incentive structure that was operationalized in this experiment. With groupbased incentive, the dominant strategy for Player 1 (column 1 shows his or her choices) is to select low effort level (row 1). The dominant strategy for the other player (row 1 shows his or her choices) is to select low effort levels (column 1). The experimental data suggest that when incentive is group based, the ratio of selecting optimal effort to all effort levels is .32 for FGDSS groups and .17 for DGDSS groups. This difference is statistically significant using a statistical test of ratios (p < .01), and hence Hypothesis 5 is supported using a statistical test for comparing ratios. This means that the rich channel in FGDSS groups helps group members to develop a cooperative context to select the cooperative strategy more often than in DGDSS groups. FGDSS facilitates this because it provides a more appropriate channel for resolving equivocality (Daft & Lengel, 1986 ), a more appropriate channel for tasks that require members to resolve uncertainty and equivocality (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993 ), a more appropriate channel for establishing a shared cooperative context (Zack, 1993) , and a channel that diminishes the degree of individualistic orientation and enhances a more cooperative orientation. When Player 1 and Player 2 select low effort strategy, the reward is 98, 196. This, however, is not the best strategy because if they all had selected the cooperative strategy, then the reward would have been 140, 208. This would have been a better strategy for all players. However, Player 1 may not select a cooperative strategy in an attempt to protect himself or herself from receiving the payoff of 37 if others decide to choose the dominant strategy and select low effort cooperative strategy to receive the payoff that results from the grand coalition. FGDSS members with group-based incentive, on average, identified the cooperative strategy as the best strategy more frequently than did their DGDSS counterparts. The rich channel in FGDSS helped decision makers to correctly identify the cooperative strategy more frequently than did the lean channel in DGDSS. This may imply that group-based incentive structures may be dysfunctional in a computer-supported GDSS setting that provides a lean channel of communication. On the other hand, the individual-based incentive structure seems to result in improved decision quality in DGDSS settings.
Hypothesis 6
The results of the analysis of truthfulness suggest interesting results. The members in FGDSS groups with group-based incentive structure reported untruthful information in 19.70% of all information that they exchanged. On the other hand, the members of DGDSS groups with group-based incentive reported untruthful information in 82.54% of the cases. The difference between the truthfulness of members in FGDSS and DGDSS was significant (p < .0005). Under the individual-based incentive structure, members in FGDSS groups engaged in untruthful information exchange 11.43% of the time, whereas this figure was 53.97% for members in DGDSS groups (p < .005). These two results together lend support to Hypothesis 6 that regardless of the incentive structure employed, members in FGDSS groups are more truthful than are their DGDSS counterparts (p < .0005). Hence, the richer communication channel and the multiplicity of the cues that are communicated help members exchange more truthful information.
Hypothesis 7
On average, when we combine the groups with the two incentive structures, members of FGDSS groups are less frustrated with the process (M = 4.69, SD = 1.74) than are those of DGDSS groups (M = 4.88, SD = 2.11). This difference, however, is not statistically significant (p > .1). However, we found an interaction effect with respect to frustration between communication channel and incentive structure. Hence, we compared the four cells pairwise. The results of this analysis revealed a very interesting result. Frustration with the process was higher in DGDSS groups (M = 6.22, SD = 1.18) than in FGDSS groups (M = 4.0, SD = 1.2), as predicted by Hypothesis 7, only when the incentive structure was individual based (p < .01, Cohen's d 2 = 1.81).
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We expected this result based on social presence theory and MRT. With the individual-based incentive structure, each member's reward was not affected by the choices that other members made. Surprisingly, however, frustration with the process was higher among members in FGDSS groups (M = 5.28, SD = 1.35) than among members in DGDSS groups (M = 4.10, SD = 1.45) when the incentive structure was group based (p < .01, Cohen's d 2 = 1.80).
With group-based incentive, members had to establish a shared cooperative context or engage in competition and select dominant strategies. The channel in FGDSS did not filter any signs of hostility and absence of cooperation, whereas the channel in DGDSS did filter such behavior, positively affecting frustration with the process. Hence, the incentive structure mitigated the negative influence of a constrained communication environment on frustration with the process. This argument may explain why the less restrictive FGDSS channel was more frustrating for group-based incentive structure. Table 3 summarizes the results of the experiment for Hypotheses 1 to 7.
Discussion
The current study set out to empirically examine the effect of two different incentive structures, individual-based and group-based incentive structures, and two different communication channels used in a GDSS (i.e., FGDSS and DGDSS) on several measurable outcome and process variables. The framework of the study is captured in Figure 4 . All groups were supported by a Level Two GDSS that supports communication and decision tools as explained earlier. Because a GDSS operates in a sociotechnical environment, the effect of variables that are outside the scope of the GDSS, such as incentive structure and communication channel, need to be well understood before distributed decision making can be managed to support efficient and effective decision making in human organizations. This is crucial given that many of today's virtual organizations are increasingly using lean channels of communication on the Internet. We found that incentive structure can mitigate the effect of communication channels. The individual-based incentive structure, in the absence of task interdependence across members, resulted in higher organizational profit in our simulated company, more truthful information exchange, and more optimal effort level decisions when members use a DGDSS. On the other hand, group-based incentive structure promoted free riding more in DGDSS groups than in FGDSS groups. Hence, there may be a better fit between individual-based incentives and computer-supported distributed work environments than there is between these environments and group- The results of the study show that organizational performance is better when each member is rewarded based on his or her contribution (individualbased incentive) than when every member receives an allocation of the payoff from the grand coalition when incentive is group based. A group-based incentive structure, as operationalized in the current study, may result in decisions that result in lower effort levels. Members exerting lower effort levels essentially take free rides from others because they receive a group payoff that is mostly generated from the effort of others. This suggests that when using lean communication channels, incentives should minimize interdependence of payoffs to prevent free-riding behavior. That is, the lack of a cooperative social context can promote free riding otherwise in DGDSS groups.
Under the lean channel used in DGDSS, on the average, the decision makers found it more difficult to develop mutual awareness of a shared cooperative orientation to develop a shared cooperative context. Instead, they seemed to develop mutual awareness of a shared individualistic orientation that resulted in a relationship of mutual suspicion, free riding, and untruthful information exchange. It may be difficult to assess other members' motivational orientation and correctly identify and establish a shared cooperative context because of the low media richness of the DGDSS channel (Daft & Lengel, 1986) . Deutsch (1973) proposes that trusting behavior can occur, even when the participants behave individualistically, if their trustworthiness can be enforced by a third party (i.e., a group leader). Although groups in our study had leaders in charge, the leaders could not overcome the shortcoming of group-based incentive in a distributed DGDSS environment. Hence, if group-based incentive is used, management should promote an atmosphere that is conducive to a cooperative orientation so that members do not engage in free-riding behavior. The rich communication channel seems to mitigate some of these effects by helping decision makers to more effectively establish a cooperative context. It is important for managers to pay particular attention to free-riding behavior in a distributed DGDSS environment.
An analysis of member effort levels revealed that member efforts are lower with group-based incentive structure than with individual-based incentive. Low effort levels increase costs to the organization as they translate into low productivity and low organizational payoffs. We found that most members use the dominant strategy in selecting their effort levels when the incentive is group based, although this strategy results in inferior rewards for all participants. This behavior may be attributed to the lack of a cooperative context in the distributed environment resulting from the shortcoming of the group-based incentive structure when communication channel is too lean to develop a cooperative context and prevent free riding. Without a shared cooperative context, the members are not likely to increase their efforts to the level where it is best for all the decision makers in the group. This undesirable behavior was found to be less pronounced in FGDSS groups than in DGDSS groups because the rich communication helps develop a shared cooperative context.
The results of this study imply that group-based incentives may be dysfunctional in a DGDSS decision environment. The lesson for managers may be that if group-based incentive structures are used, management should pay particular attention to free-riding behavior and attempt to establish a shared cooperative context and trust along with the understanding that if they all cooperate they will all be better off. The GDSS decision tools should enforce binding contracts among parties to eliminate choices that are suboptimal and to make it mandatory for decision makers to agree on a joint choice strategy to cooperate.
Given that GDSS users are likely to adapt their strategies to the available features (Todd & Benbasat, 1991) , it should be possible to design GDSS features to guide decision makers into making decisions that are aligned with organizational objectives. For example, the what-if capability should calculate the incremental changes of a decision on group outcomes instead of individual outcomes. It should make it cognitively easier for decision makers to make decisions that are aligned with organizational objectives and cognitively harder for each individual to maximize his or her own interests at the expense of the organizational interest.
4 This is an issue regarding the design of incentive structures, but it also directly influences decisions related to the design of specific DGDSS features and hence the effectiveness of the DGDSS when the communication channel is lean. As decision makers adopt their strategies to the type of DGDSS features to maximize their utility and minimize cognitive burden, the decisions that are best for the organization should be less cognitively burdensome. Hence, the DGDSS features that help decision makers make decisions to promote organizational objectives should be easier to use. Alternatively, management may consider using incentives that rely on individual performance rather than group performance when members meet at different places and communicate using lean channels. This result is very managerially relevant as the design of incentive system is a variable, controllable by organizational policy makers, that should be set properly to achieve organizational objectives. This means that the effectiveness of the DGDSS is dependent on the underlying organizational structural variables such as incentive structures as incentives can mitigate the influence of communication channels on decision strategies.
Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems
The lean communication that represents much of the screen-to-face interactions in the electronic commerce environments and the design of incentives is creating new organizational structures that are less hierarchical as the notions of centrality are diminished in the DGDSS environments. In these environments, information and decision making are more distributed than in traditional environments where social presence is higher. The new forms of interactions may influence the five approaches toward organizational structure identified by Johnson (1993) . The new communication channels are likely to influence the communication relationships that define the interactions, exchanges, and flows. The GDSS environment may influence the structure of the work units or actors that Johnson refers to as entities.The diminished personalization of the DGDSS is likely to change the context that defines the norms, tasks, rules, and prior relations that structure ongoing actions and interpretations. The low social presence also influences formalization, centralization, size, complexity, and span of control to result in new recurrent patterns that are referred to as configuration. Finally, the new media can influence the temporal stability that is the extent of enduring or consistent organizational patterning that results from converging equilibrium conditions that guide the behavior of communication actors. We found that communication channel effects can be mitigated by incentive structures, and hence the proper design of economic games can influence the structure of the organization. Because structure both constrains and facilitates human action in organizational contexts, new structures can arise or be suppressed by the proper design of games that facilitate actions that result in maximizing organizational payoffs to converge to equilibrium conditions. As human behavior and action change as humans learn the new structures and as organizational designers modify the structures that become ineffective as humans learn how to operate in those environments, game payoffs and policies should be redesigned to implement the changes as DGDSS features. This dynamic model is consistent with the structuration theory (Giddens, 1979; Poole & DeSanctis, 1985) that suggests that structure imposes certain behavior but once the actors learn how to operate within those structures, they learn how to sabotage the structure, and hence new games and incentives are designed to result in new and more effective structures.
In this study we used groups of four members. Although many groups in the world do consist of four members, the reader should be cautious of extending the results of the experiments to groups with different sizes and structures. The game theory analysis and the measures developed in this study can easily be applied to groups with different sizes, but it is not clear if the experimental results, the forms of coalitions, and the truthfulness of informa-tion exchange remains the same with different group sizes. An analysis of the sensitivity of the results to group size could be one extension of the current study. In addition, the groups in this study, on average, took about 90 minutes to arrive at a decision. Although there was no time limit for each experiment, the influence of communication and incentive structure can potentially be different for group tasks with an average duration that is different from 90 minutes. Groups tend to get better at communicating using distributed systems over time (Rice & Gathiker, 2001) , and hence for tasks that take longer, the results may be different than those found in this study. This is another direction for further research.
The proliferation of information-based and decision-support technologies into virtual organizations that use DGDSS may not result in successful implementation and usage unless proper incentives are designed to prevent free riding, promote a cooperative context, and induce truthfulness in a faceless setting where decision makers are distributed.
Appendix
To operationalize two specific working incentive structures based on the above concepts, we introduce the following terms:
PC id = Projected cost (PC) of filling order i at department d. This is the best estimate the organization has regarding how much it should cost the department to fill an order. ADC ijd = Actual departmental cost (ADC) of filling order i expending effort level j at department d. For varied levels of effort, the ADC differs, and this information is internal to each department. UDEC ijd = Uncompensated departmental effort cost (UDEC) is the cost that department d incurs but is not compensated by the organization directly for filling order i for effort level j. This information is internal to each department. Rev i = The revenue generated by filling order i. Each of the two incentive structures, the individual-based and the group-based incentive structures, will be explained next.
Individual-based incentive
Typical of many organizational incentive structures, member (department manager) bonus is based on how well each department controls its ADC compared to its PC. A department receives a bonus equal to a percentage of the difference between the ADCs and PCs.
a To lower the ADCs in an attempt to maximize bonus, each department incurs some UDEC. The UDEC is the monetary equivalent estimate to model such intangible costs as the costs because of higher pressure on departmental employees, costs associated with meeting tighter schedules, and higher stress because of a more intense workload. The UDEC is borne by the department and is not directly compensated by the organization, hence the name uncompensated.
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For each order selected, the internalized reward for each departmental manager is equal to the bonus he or she receives, minus the uncompensated costs (personal costs) the department incurs for increased effort. Figure 1 presents an example of the relationships among different costs, bonuses, and rewards. The figure graphically shows that as a member increases his or her effort level, the ADC goes down, and hence the deviation of ADC and PC widens, resulting in a higher bonus. However, because increased bonus is associated with increased UDEC, the reward that is the bonus minus the UDEC is not necessarily an increasing function of effort level. The figure shows that from the perspective of each member, there exists an optimal effort for each order.
For ease of exposition and to avoid overly complicating the experiment, we selected four discrete levels of effort (including the optimal) and presented the corresponding values of ADC and UDEC to the participants. These points are four points on effort levels with the values corresponding to the continuous curves shown in Figure 1 . The reward because of selecting a subset of orders (among 20 orders) and expending an effort level (choices were 1, 2, 3, or 4) at department d (three departments of marketing, production, and purchasing) is the objective that, along with the product capacity constraints, leads to the model of the problem, PROB-INDIVIDUAL, given below: PC id = PC of filling order i at department d. This is the best estimate the organization has regarding how much it should cost the department to fill an order.
PROB-INDIVIDUAL:
ADC ijd = ADC of filling order i expending effort level j at department d. For varied levels of effort, the ADC differs, and this information is internal to each department. UDEC ijd = UDEC is the cost that department d incurs but is not compensated by the organization directly for filling order i for effort level j. This information is internal to each department.
With this incentive structure, utility theory predicts that each member will select effort at a level where the marginal increase in bonus is equal to the marginal cost of extra effort. The effort level of one department manager has no effect on another department manager's reward.
The problem faced by the members to select effort levels and orders can be divided into two separate subproblems. The first subproblem is to select effort levels for each order. This subproblem is easily solved by employing marginal analysis as a decision rule. Once optimal effort levels are selected, the best ADC and UDEC, ADC* and UDEC* respectively, will be used to solve the second subproblem of selecting a subset of the orders. The second subproblem, SPROB-INDIVIDUAL, is modeled as follows: 
SPROB-INDIVIDUAL:
Group-based incentive
A percentage of the organizational profit is assigned for bonuses, and each member receives an equal percentage of this allocated bonus pool.
b Organizational profit is calculated by subtracting the sum of ADCs incurred at the three departments from the revenues generated by the selected orders. Hence, the bonus each member receives depends on the ADCs of other members as well as his or her own. If costs of other members are assumed constant, then each member may find the optimal effort level for each order, and this information is available locally at the department. However, because of the interaction between a member's bonus and other members' costs, isolated local effort decisions (the dominant strategy) do not result in the best reward for all members. Figure 2 shows an example of the relationship among costs, rewards, and bonuses when incentive is group based. The figure shows that as a member increases his or her effort level, the ADC goes down, and hence the deviation between revenue and sum of the ADCs at the three departments widens, resulting in a higher bonus for each member. However, because increased bonus is associated with increased UDEC, the reward that is bonus minus the UDEC is not necessarily an increasing function of the effort Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems Barkhi • Group Decision Support Systems
